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The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants 
To Employees of New Economy Firms 
Abstract 
The paper examines the determinants and performance consequences of equity grants to senior-
level executives, lower-level managers, and non-exempt employees of"new economy" firms . We find 
that many of the equity grant determinants and their relative importance vary significantly between new 
and old economy firms. In addition, we find that employee retention objectives, which new economy 
firms rank as the most important goal of their equity grant programs, have a significant impact on new 
hire grants, but not on annual, ongoing grants. Our exploratory performance tests indicate that lower than 
expected option grants and/or ex isting option holdings are associated with lower accounting and stock 
price performance in subsequent years. However, we find that greater than expected option and equity 
grants and holdings have little consistent association with future performance. 
The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants 
To Employees of New Economy Firms 
1. Introduction 
Few shifts in the U.S. economy have captured the attention ofthe business world as much as the 
emergence and performance of "new economy" frrrns1 One distinctive feature of these firms is their 
aggressive reliance on the use of equity grants (stock options and restricted stock) as integral components 
of their compensation packages for executive and non-executive employees. Relative to more traditional 
firms , new economy firms provide a larger proportion of compensation in the form of equity grants, have 
more unexercised stock options as a percent of total shares outstanding, and are more likely to use broad-
based stock option programs that cover employees throughout the organization (Anderson, Banker, and 
Ravindran, 2000; Sesil, Kroumova, Blasi, and Kruse, 2000). 
Some observers argue that the extensive use of equity grants by new economy firms has allowed 
them to improve performance by enhancing the attraction and retention of key employees (particularly in 
critical technical positions) and by providing superior incentives for employees to enhance shareholder 
value. Others, however, charge that the large, broad-based equity grants in this sector are excessive and 
create the potential for excessive dilution of the equity stakes of existing shareholders, promote job-
hopping within the industry, provide weak incentives to lower-level employees who have relatively little 
influence on firm performance, and do little to increase the ability to attract and retain non-executive 
employees who are motivated more by the characteristics of the job, career opportunities, and other perks 
than by monetary incentives (e.g., W elles, 1998; Coy, 1999). 
This study uses detailed data on the compensation practices of new economy firms to examine 
three research questions: (1 ) To what extent are the large equity grants in new economy firms driven by 
the same economic factors as those driv ing grants in more traditional f irms?; (2) Do the same economic 
1 There is not yet a generally agreed upon definition of"new economy" firms. We define new economy firms as 
organizations competing in the computer, software, internet, telecommunications, or networking fields. 
factors explain equity grants across functions and hierarchical levels of new economy firms? ; and (3) To 
what extent are equity grants to employees of new economy firms associated with subsequent firm 
performance?. We examine these questions using survey data collected by iQuantic Inc. in 1999 and 
2000. 
In contrast to the primary emphasis on incentive, tax, and cash flow issues in prior compensation 
studies, the firms in our sample rank employee retention as the most important objective of their equity 
grant programs. The importance of this objective has a significant positive influence on equity grants to 
newly hired employees, but is not statistically associated with ongoing equity grants. Our analyses 
indicate that the relative importance of a number of the hypothesized economic determinants of equity 
grants vary significantly between new and old economy firms. Moreover, equity grants to executives of 
new economy firms remain larger than those of "old economy" firms even after controlling for the 
hypothesized determinants. Equity grants across functions and hierarchical levels within new economy 
firms appear to be driven by similar economic factors. 
Based on these analyses, we develop benchmark models for assessing the relative size of an 
individual grant (i.e., whether the grant is large or small relative to the grants of similar new economy 
companies for that hierarchical position or functional area). We use these benchmark results to provide 
some exploratory insights into the association between equity grants and subsequent accounting and stock 
market returns. Lower than predicted option grants to chief executive officers (CEOs ), directors, and 
technical employees are associated with lower subsequent accounting return on assets. Similarly, existing 
option holdings by top executives that are smaller than predicted are associated with lower return on 
assets and stock price performance following the grant. However, equity grants that are greater than 
expected have relatively little negative association with future performance, providing no support for 
claims that the large equity grants by new economy f irms adversely impact shareholder value. 
The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. Section 2 develops our research 
questions. Section 3 provides a description of the sample and variables. Sections 4 and 5 present 
empirical results on the determinants of equity grants and the association between equity grants and 
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performance, respectively. The final section summarizes the results and discusses limitations to our 
analyses. 
2. Research Questions 
2.1 Determinants Of Equity Grants 
Although stock options and restricted stock are ubiquitous features of executive compensation 
contracts in U. S. firms, theoretical work has achieved little success in formally deriving situations under 
which stock option and restricted stock grants are components of optimal compensation contracts, or in 
deriving comparativ e statics results explaining how the usage of options should vary2 Instead, most 
papers discuss the costs and benefits of equity-based compensation relative to (frequently unspecified) 
other forms compensation (e.g., Lewellen, Loderer, and Martin (1 987), Smith and Watts (1 992), Clinch, 
1991; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Yermack (1 995), Janakiraman (1 998), Core and Guay (1 999, 2001), 
Anderson, Banker, and Ravindran (2000)). These discussions typically emphasize three potential benefits 
from equity grants: (1 ) incentive effects, (2) tax savings, and (3) cash flow considerations. A key 
question is whether the larger equity grants in new economy firms relativ e to more traditional firms are 
due to differences in these economic factors. 
The incentive effects of equity-based compensation are hypothesized to be related to the 
following key features of stock option grants: (1) the option's payoff is a convex function of stock price 
performance, (2) employees must hold options for a non-triv ial amount of time before the options vest, 
(3) employees cannot sell the options, and ( 4) employees generally must exercise or forfeit their options 
shortly after leaving the firm. The benefits from each of these features are likely to vary between old and 
2 To our knowledge, the only paper that has derived a stock option-based contract as optimal is Innes (1990), where 
limited liability on the part of the principal and the agent are key features of the environment. Option-like contracts 
can also be derived from models by appending limited liability constraints (or lower bonnds on the contractual 
payments) to models that derive linear contracts as optimal. For example, Banker and Datar (1988) use the 
Holmstrom (1979) formulation and derive conditions where the optimal contract is linear over the range of 
outcomes where the first-order condition on optimal contract applies. If a lower bound on the payments exists, this 
lower bound will apply to outcomes below some cut-offpoint (which can be interpreted as the option's exercise 
price), and the linear contract will apply to outcomes above this exercise price. Many analytical papers derive results 
where the optimal contract is convex, but do not derive contracts having the piecewise linear structure of stock 
options (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979, Hemmer, Kim, and Verrecchia, 2000; Core and Qian, 2000). 
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new economy firms . For example, the convex shape of the option contract can motivate higher degrees of 
risk taking (see Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2000, for empirical evidence)3 This is likely to be more important 
in new economy firms that are pursuing unproven, riskier strategies. 4 The availability and quality of 
performance measures other than stock price also varies with the growth opportunities and life cycle of 
the firm (e.g., Clinch, 1991; Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993). In young firms, firms in 
the early stages of product development, high growth firms, and firms undertaking extensive research and 
development or investment in "intangible" assets, accounting measures do not reflect all of the anticipated 
future period consequences associated with decisions being made today, even though the investments in 
R&D, brand name, customer satisfaction, and other intangible assets are expensed the period they are 
incurred. Therefore, new economy firms in these situations are expected to base incentives on more 
forward-looking stock price measures rather than accounting measures in order to increase the 
performance measures' informativeness and lengthen the decision-making horizon of employees. 
Prior research also suggests that cash constraints and tax implications should lead to greater use 
of equity grants by new economy firms. In contrast to salary and most forms of annual bonus, 
compensating employees using stock options does not require a current outlay of cash by the firm. As a 
result, firms experiencing cash flow difficulties (such as those in early stages of their product life cycle) 
are expected to make greater use of options to conserve cash (e.g. , Yermack, 1995; Core and Guay, 1999, 
2001). 5 Options granted at the money are not taxed to the employee or deductib le to the firm at the time 
3In contrast, analytical work by Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) shows that if executives are risk averse 
and undiversified, options which are expected to finish far in the money can motivate executives to become more 
risk averse, rather than less. 
4 Prendergast (2000) provides additional reasons for a positive link between risk and incentives that emphasize the 
increased use of incentives to compensate for the difficulty in monitoring in uncertain environments. While these 
arguments suggests option use may be greater in riskier firms such as those operating in the new economy, there is a 
countervailing force. Agency theory suggest that incentive based pay will decrease, ceteris paribus, the noisier the 
performance measure, because it is costly to the firm to impose compensation risk on a risk averse employee. Thus, 
the use of option grants may actually be lower in riskier firms. 
5 This argument implies that firms are using employees to help finance the firm. It is not clear why employees 
would allow the firm to use them as an inexpensive source of financing. One possibility (an extreme version of the 
sorting argument discussed below) is that options attract employees who are risk seeking. For example, some 
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of the grant, although they can have tax effects later (depending on the type of option). These tax rules 
lead Yermack (1 995) and Core and Guay (1999, 2001) to argue that firms should use more stock options 
in periods when current tax rates are low, which is more likely in less profitable new economy firms than 
in more traditional companies. 
Two potential benefits of equity-based compensation that have received relatively little attention 
in prior empirical studies are improving the attraction and retention of key employees. These two 
benefits are viewed by many to be particularly important in new economy firms, which faced tight labor 
markets for key technical personnel at the time the data in our study were collected (e.g., Battey, 2000, 
Portnot and Moltzen, 2000). From a theoretical standpoint, if the objective is merely to attract workers, 
the level of compensation should be important, not the form of the compensation. The importance of 
equity-based incentives as an attraction device must therefore be related to attracting the right "type" of 
employee. In particular, options can play a screening or sorting role because some types of employees 
will find option-based contracts more attractive than will other types6 For example, option-based 
contracts are more attractive to employees who are less risk averse. This is likely to be a more important 
benefit to firms operating in high-risk environments such as the new economy, where many firms are 
pursuing untested products, markets, and business models. Option-based contracts are also more 
attractive to employees with higher skill levels who have greater ability to take actions that cause their 
options to finish in the money. The sorting role is most beneficial in situations where the impact of skill 
employees may view taking a job at a new economy start-up like playing the lottery. If the current job does not 
work out, they can easily move to another start-up company or take a position with a more traditional firm (a 
possibility that was probably more realistic during the period covered by our survey than it is today). It is also 
possible that employees perceive the firm's risk differently than fmancial institutions. For example, employees in 
key functional areas may have technical knowledge and familiarity with the finn's projects and strategies that cannot 
be credibly conveyed to an outside financial institution. Finally, employees may not be able to understand the risks 
they are taking on, either in terms of compensation risk or employment risk. For example, they may be more 
optimistic about the firm's future prospects than an outside "objective" observer. 
6 In many respects, the role of the contract in sorting employees by talent is similar to that of motivating effort. 
Hagerty and Siegel (1992), for example, establish conditions where moral hazard models and adverse selection 
models can be represented in identical fashions. However, the sorting role is likely to be more important for newly 
hired employees. 
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on the firm's stock price is highest, such as firms with considerable intangible assets and growth 
opportunities (Core and Qian, 2000). 
Stock options (as well as restricted stock) also motivate employees to remain with the firm 
because of vesting periods that require employees to remain with the firm for a period of time (generally 
one to four years) before they can exercise their options, and because option contracts generally impose a 
"penalty" on the employee for leaving (i. e., the employee must exercise his vested options early). 
Retention becomes more valuable to the firm when employees can take information, know-how, or 
technology with them that can be used by competitors, a problem that is compounded when the 
employee's cost of changing jobs is low. The latter benefit is likely to be a function of the concentration 
of related j obs in the region, the demand for certain professions, and the amount of firm-specific human 
capital required, each of which was quite high in the new economy labor market during this period 
(Battey, 2000). 
If the same economic model linking the preceding features to equity grants applies to both new 
and old economy firms, the level of equity grants in the two sectors should be similar after controlling for 
these features. In contrast, discussions in the business press and academic literature suggest that the same 
economic model of equity grant behavior does not apply to both sectors. Articles by Brandal (2000) and 
Portnot and Moltzen (2000), for example, suggest that equity grants in new economy firms reflect 
significantly different economic priorities or a completely different set of factors that are not yet in 
equilibrium (e.g., imitating competitors because optimal practices in this rapidly-evolving industrial 
sector are not yet known). Research by Anderson, Banker, and Ravindran (2000) finds that information 
technology firms and firms in the Silicon Valley make larger equity grants than more traditional firms 
even after controlling for the traditional economic determinants used in prior empirical research. 
However, their study assumes that the economic model linking equity grants to their hypothesized 
determinants is the same for all firms, and does not allow the coefficients to vary across sectors. Balkin, 
Markman, and Gomez-Mejia (2000) find that long-term, equity-based CEO compensation is related to the 
level of innovations (R&D spending and number of patents) in high technology manufacturers, but not in 
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other manufacturers. Their results suggest that the influence of this economic characteristic on equity-
based compensation is quite different in the two sectors, but the inferences from their tests are limited by 
the exclusion of other potential economic determinants. The inconclusive results in these studies lead to 
our first research question: 
To what extent are the large equity grants in new economy firms driven by the same economic factors 
as those driving grants in more traditional firms? 
2.2 Equity Grant Determinants Across Hierarchical Levels and Functions 
Most prior stock option studies focus on the determinants of option grants to executives7 Yet one of 
the distinctive features of new economy firms is their widespread use of broad-based stock option plans 
that cover employees throughout the company (Pepe, 1998). Although most incentive contracting models 
are general enough to cover any level or function, the relative importance of different economic factors in 
determining equity grants can vary due to issues such differences in risk aversion and ability to influence 
firm performance. For example, employees must be in a position to impact stock price through their 
actions for stock options to be an effective means of providing incentives. However, indiv iduals at lower 
hierarchical levels have less ability than executives to impact stock price through their actions, reducing 
the benefits from broad based equity grant programs. The ability to impact stock price is also likely to 
differ across functional areas. For example, in many new economy firms, the development of new 
technology is an important driver of success. Therefore, employees working in technical areas (such as 
engineering, information technology, and research and development) have a stronger ability to impact 
stock price in these firms, leading to greater use of stock options in these functions. 
Theory also suggests that information asymmetries play a role in the design of incentive contracts. 
When managers are privately informed about the profitability of investments, incentive-based contracts 
7 Exceptions include Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995), who examine business unit managers, and Core and 
Guay (2001), who investigate non-executive employees (defined as all employees other than the top five executives 
in the firm). 
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are useful even if the employees' actions are observed. 8 In particular, the convex shape of option 
contracts motivates managers to tailor the aggressiveness of their investment as a function of how 
profitable their private information indicates the investment will be (Core and Quian, 2000). The degree 
of information asymmetry between employees and shareholders is likely to be higher in highly technical 
functions than in other functions within the firm. 
Finally, the availability and quality of performance measures other than stock price varies across 
functions. For example, in sales and marketing functions, commission-based incentives provide a more 
direct link between actions and outcomes, while in production areas operational performance measures 
often provide an effective means of providing incentives. In contrast, it is more difficult to directly 
measure performance in situations where there is a significant amount of priv ate information possessed by 
the employees. Therefore, in more technical areas, a greater proportion of incentives is likely to come via 
options. These issues lead to our second research question: 
Do the same economic factors explain equity grants across functions and hierarchical levels of 
new economy firms? 
2.3 Evidence on Performance Consequences of Equity Grants 
Perhaps the most complex question raised by the large equity grants by new economy firms is 
their performance consequences. This issue has generated considerable controversy, with proponents 
arguing that the large grants are necessary for attracting, retaining, and motivating the appropriate type of 
employee and opponents charging that the grants are excessive (e.g., Welles, 1998; Coy, 1999). Yet, 
despite the large body of research on equity-based compensation, empirical evidence on the performance 
consequences of equity grants is limited and mixed. Abowd (1990) examines the relation between the 
sensitivity of compensation (salary and bonus) to total shareholder returns and stock returns in the 
following year. He finds a positive relation, but does not directly examine the performance benefits from 
equity grants . DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990) find the approval of executive stock option plans 
8 This occurs because the principal is unable to detennine whether the correct action has been taken given the 
manager's private information. See Lambert (1 986) and Baker (1992) for further analysis. 
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accompanied by significant positive stock market and negative bond market reactions. Their study does 
not examine ongoing equity grants or their magnitudes. Anderson, Banker, and Rav indran (2000) 
estimate a simultaneous equations model linking executive bonuses, stock option grants, and 
contemporaneous stock returns. They find significant positive simultaneous relations between annual 
option grants and same period stock returns, and conclude that the extent of incentive pay positively 
affects performance. However, the use of contemporaneous stock returns makes it difficult to determine 
whether the option grants were rewards for performance during the year or whether they induced superior 
performance. 
Value relevance studies also provide conflicting results. A boody (1996) finds a negative 
association between the value of all outstanding employee stock options and share prices for a broad set 
of firms. Bell, Landsman, Miller, and Yeh (2000) and Keating, Lys, and Magee (200 1 ), on the other 
hand, find positive association between employee stock options and market v alue in computer software 
firms and internet firms, respectively . 
Canyon and Freeman (2000) look at broad-based stock option plans covering employees 
throughout the company, and find the presence of a company share option plan associated with 
significantly higher productivity. Similarly, Sesil, Kroumova, Kruse, and Blasi (2000) find significant, 
positive associations between the presence of broad-based option plans and productivity, sales growth, 
and Tobin's Q, but no association with total shareholder returns. A related study of new economy firms 
(Sesil, Kroumova, Blasi, and Kruse, 2000) indicates that firms with broad-based stock option plans had 
higher labor productiv ity, Tobin' s Q, and patent levels than new economy firms without such plans, but 
finds little ev idence that performance changes differed in the two groups. Moreover, total shareholder 
returns were somewhat lower in the stock option group than in a matched sample of new economy firms 
without these plans. A major limitation to these three studies is the use of simple dichotomous variables 
to indicate the presence of broad-based stock option plans, and the lack of data on what organizational 
levels or functions received the options or the magnitude of the grants. 
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The limited and inconclusiv e evidence on the performance consequences of equity grants leads to 
our third research question: 
To what extent are equity grants to employees of new economy firms associated with subsequent firm 
performance? 
We consider this research question to be crucially important for understanding observed compensation 
contract designs. However, we acknowledge that the endogeneity of equity grants (discussed more fully 
in Section 5.1) and the difficulty in constructing well-specified tests for detecting performance differences 
limit our ability to assess the performance consequences of equity grants. Thus, we view this research 
question as exploratory and speculative. 
3. Data and Variables 
3.1 Sample 
Our data are obtained from detailed mail surveys of new economy firms conducted by iQuantic 
Inc. during 1999 and 2000, with the surveys covering equity grants made during fiscal 1998 and 1999, 
respectiv ely9 Our sample consists of 21 7 unique firms. 10 Personal correspondence with iQuantic 
management indicates that less than 20% of the sample purchased consulting services of some kind from 
iQuantic during the calendar year of data collection. Similar to all studies using proprietary data collected 
by consulting firms, our sample is likely to exhibit some selection bias, which will limit our ability to 
generalize our results. However, since the incidence of iQuantic consulting for the sample is modest, we 
believe that our data provide general insights into compensation plan design choices and do not simply 
reveal the consulting recommendations made to these firms by iQuantic. 
As shown in Table 1, the majority of respondents are located in the western United States, with 
another large cluster on the east coast (Panel A). The sample spans a variety of industrial sectors 
9 iQuantic Inc. is a human resource consulting firm headquartered in San Francisco that focuses on new economy 
firms. The survey questionnaires are sent out in January and the data are collected in March. 
10 There is some overlap in firms contained in the two surveys. We retain only one observation per firm by deleting 
responses to the 2000 survey for firms in both the 1999 and 2000 surveys. 
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associated with the new economy, with the largest membership in the software and semiconductor sectors 
(Panel B). The firms are relatively young, with the median initial public offering completed 
approximately seven years ago (Panel C). The typical respondent is relatively small, with a median 
market capitalization of $1,137 million, sales of $244 million, and 1,130 employees. 
One attribute of this sample is the limited use of compensation components such as annual 
bonuses and performance plans that are commonly found in traditional firms. For example, iQuantic 
(1 999) finds that 99% of the firms in their survey have an annual bonus, but the annual bonus payoff only 
ranges between six and nine percent of the total compensation paid to executives. Similarly, performance 
shares (11% of the firms) and performance units (5% of the firms) are used infrequently, and the dollar 
magnitudes of these grants are very small. Thus, we can restrict our focus to equity grants (stock options 
and restricted stock) and annual salary, without introducing serious measurement error into our metrics.11 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Equity Programs 
As shown in Table 2, the survey respondents report a variety of objectives for their stock option 
and restricted stock programs . The scores in Table 2 were computed from the respondent ranking 
assigned to each of the objectives, where a rank of one was assigned to the most important objective and 
unranked objectives were assigned a rank one higher than the last objective ranked by the respondent 
(e.g., if the respondent ranked four out of the seven objectives, the umanked objectives were assigned a 
rank of five). The ranks for a specific objective were then transformed into a scale score ranging from 
zero to 100 (where the score = 100 x (maximum rank across all objectives- rank of a specific 
objective)/(maximum rank across all objectives- minimum rank across all objectives)). The objective 
with the highest ranking was assigned a score of 1 00 and the score for the lowest ranked or umanked 
objective was assigned a score of zero. 
11 For employees in sales and marketing, corrunissions are included as part of the salary figures collected by 
iQuantic. Virtually all the restricted stock grants in our sample are to employees at the vice-president level or 
higher. Therefore, nearly all of the equity incentives for lower level employees are in the form of stock options. 
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Two of the primary motivations for implementing these programs are retaining existing employees 
and attracting new employees (i.e., labor market considerations). Other key objectives for stock options 
are rewarding the completion of specific milestones or goals and linking the individual to company 
performance (i.e., incentive issues), while providing competitive total compensation is an important 
motivation for granting restricted stock (a labor market consideration that is likely to be related to 
attraction and retention of employees). Interestingly, using equity grants to encourage stock ownership is 
of lesser importance. 
CEOs are eligible for the equity grant programs in 97.9% of the firms, vice presidents in 99.7%, 
directors in 98.0%, managers in 94.5%, individual contributors in 86. 8%, non-exempt employees in 
61.1 %, technical employees in 94.4%, non-technical employees in 92.4%, and sales personnel in 90.6%. 12 
The typical frequency of option grants is annual (88.7% grant annually and 8.5% grant semi-annually or 
more frequently), with the majority of options having an exercise price equal to the fair market value of 
the stock at the date of grant. Approximately 40% of our firms have the authority to grant restricted 
stock, with 20.7% granting restricted stock during the time period covered by the survey. 
3.3 Equity Grant Measures 
We examine the value of grants to employees at different positions and in different functional 
areas. The data represent either the grant guideline (or target) for the number of stock options and 
restricted stock at a specific salary level for a position, or (when the guideline is not available) the average 
actual stock options and restricted shares granted at a specific salary level within a position. 13 These 
positions include senior executiv es (chief executive officer and vice-presidents), directors (technical and 
non-technical functions), managers (technical, non-technical, and sales functions), individual contributors 
12 CEOs actually participate in the plans in 85.2% of the firms, vice presidents in 89.5%, directors in 83.6%, 
managers in 7 1.5%, individual contributors in 50.9%, non-exempt employees in 27.8%, technical employees in 
71.0%, non-technical employees in 67.0%, and sales personnel in 61.2%. 
13 Approximately 65% of the firms use formal guidelines or targets for grants across the positions. In addition, 
approximately 85% to 90% of the actual grants for each position are within 10% of the guideline or target. Thus, the 
guideline data are quite close to the actual grants of stock options and restricted stock. 
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(technical, non-technical, and sales positions), and non-exempt employees.14 Functional areas include 
technical, non-technical, and sales operations. Thus, our equity grant data correspond to the 
representative or typical payment for a specific employee position. 
We sum the value of options and restricted stock to measure the annual equity grant for the 
various positions and functions. Consistent with most studies, restricted stock is valued by multiplying 
the number of shares by the fair market value of a share at the date of grant. iQuantic values stock 
options using the discounted expected gain approach, with an assumed annual stock price growth of 15%, 
a five year holding period before the option is exercised, and a risk-free rate of 5%. Although a relatively 
unsophisticated approach for valuing option grants, analytical studies question whether more 
sophisticated methods such as the Black-Scholes model are applicable to the valuation of stock options 
for employees (e.g., Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991 ). Moreover, most firms use very simple 
approaches to value their option grants and to communicate option plans with employees. Specifically, 
the Black-Scholes model is used for these purposes by only 22.5% of the firms in our sample, whereas 
23.5% use the present value of the expected gain, 18.0% use the strike price multiplied by the number of 
options granted, 32.0% do not use any type of valuation model, and 4.0% use some other valuation 
approach.15 
To develop a parsimonious measure of equity intensity, we divide the average equity grant value 
for each position (computed using the method above) by average equity grant value plus the average 
14 The vice president level includes all corporate officers except the CEO (i.e., chief operating officer, chief financial 
officer, and chief information officer), senior vice-presidents, vice presidents, and assistant vice presidents. 
Individual contributors are non-managerial, exempt employees. Technical employees develop, research, and 
provide high-level technical support for the company's products. Non-technical employees are neither technical nor 
part of sales, and include, among others, finance, legal, human resources, and customer service. 
15 The approach used for valuing stock options is somewhat primitive because it will value each stock option at 
approximately 79% of the exercise price. Although, as discussed in the text, the use ofBlack-Scholes is 
theoretically problematic, we repeated the subsequent analyses using Black-Scholes methods. As expected given 
the differences in volatility (Table 4), the mean value of option grants using Black-Scholes was 55% of the exercise 
price for new economy firms and 38% for old economy firms. However, our results were not substantively affected 
by using the Black-Scholes valuation approach. In particular, variables that are statistically significant in Table 6 
remained significant, while those that were not significant remained insignificant. The primary changes related to 
the comparisons between new and old economy firms in Table 6, which were much more pronounced in terms of 
coefficient differences and significance levels. 
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salary for the position. The resulting measure (%EQUITY GRANI) represents the percentage of total 
compensation that is equity-based. Statistics for the technical functions are the average compensation 
figures for technical employees at the director, manager, and indiv idual contributor levels. Similar 
computations are made for non-technical functions. Sales function measures are the average 
compensation for manager and indiv idual contributor levels. 
Descriptive statistics for the value of equity grants, salary, and the equity grant percentage are 
presented in Table 316 Consistent with prior research (e.g., Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt, 1993), salary 
levels and the value of equity grants monotonically decrease down the organizational hierarchy. The 
median CEO's compensation is 86.9% equity-based, while the median non-exempt employee receives 
10.8% of compensation in the form of equity grants. Salary levels across functional areas are quite 
similar, with technical employees having slightly higher equity grant values and equity grants as a percent 
of compensation. 
3.4 Determinants of Equity Grant Intensity 
3.4.1 Incentive Measures 
Our first set of predictor variables attempts to capture the hypothesized incentive-related 
determinants of equity grants in new economy firms. 
Investment Opportunity Set. Similar to Gaver and Gaver (1 993) and Baber, Janakiraman, and 
Kang (1 996), we use multiple indicators to measure the firm' s investment opportunity set. These 
indicators are the ratio of book value to market value (an inverse measure of investment opportunities), 
the ratio of research and development expenditures to sales, the advertising to sales ratio, sales growth in 
the prior year, and the natural logarithm of firm age (defined as the number of years since the firm' s 
16 In order to mitigate the impact of extreme observations for this somewhat unusual set of flrms, equity grant values 
and predictor variables are winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels of the observed distributions. 
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initial public offering, with younger firms assumed to have larger growth opportunities ). 17 The results of 
a principal component analysis reveal that the five indicators load on a single factor that retains 48 
percent of the variation in the data. The Cronbach alpha for the indicators is 0. 64, indicating adequate 
internal consistency among the measures (i.e. , the five indicators of this construct exhibit substantial 
positive bivariate correlations). The latent variable I nvestOppSet represents the average standardized 
value of these five variables. 18 Consistent with prior studies, we predict a positive association between 
the investment opportunity set and equity grants. 
Past Peiformance. Three variables measure elements of past performance that are expected to 
influence equity grants. Stock market performance is measured using the average continuously 
compounded monthly return over the 12-months prior to the start of the fiscal year associated with the 
equity grant (Prior Return). For example, the 1999 survey collected data for grants that typically were 
made at the end of 1997 or beginning of 1998. Thus, this variable is measured over the time period from 
January 1997 to December 1997 for a company with a December fiscal year end that was included in the 
1999 survey. W e use prior pretax income divided by total assets (Return on Assets) measured over a 
similar period as an alternative measure of past performance. If equity grants are used to reward past 
performance, they should be positively associated with past accounting and market performance. 
We also examine the volatility (standard deviation) of stock returns over the prior year 
(Volatility). The compensation literature provides conflicting hypotheses regarding the relation between 
equity grants and stock price volatility. One argument is that high volatility makes stock price a noisy 
indicator of employ ee performance, and therefore imposes more risk on the employee. This view 
suggests that fewer equity grants will be used in high variance f irms. A counter-argument is that the 
17 For cases where research and development or advertising was missing, we imputed a value of zero for these 
variables. 
18 The book-to-market ratio and firm age are reverse coded in this computation. We use an equal weighting of the 
standardized indicators rather than using the principal component weights or loadings to compute InvestOppSet. 
This is consistent with the recommendations of Grice and Harris ( 1998), who find that unit-weighted composites 
exhibit better psychometric properties than factor scores. 
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convex shape of stock options makes them more valuable to employees when volatility is high. The latter 
view suggests that stock price volatility and equity grants should be positively correlated. 
Firm Size. We measure firm size using the natural logarithm of the number of employees. Prior 
studies provide conflicting hypotheses regarding the relation between the use of equity grants and firm 
size. One hypothesis suggests that it is more difficult to monitor managers in larger firms, and thus there 
is more need to use options as an incentive device. An alternative hypothesis suggests that options will be 
used less in larger firms because it is more difficult for indiv idual employees to affect firm value. Given 
the conflicting implications of these hypotheses, the predicted relation between equity grants and number 
of employees is unclear. 
A lternative Monitoring M echanisms. Corporate governance mechanisms provide an alternative 
to the explicit use of equity-based incentives. For example, holders of large blocks of stock have greater 
incentive to monitor the actions of managers and greater power to force managers to allow monitoring to 
occur (e.g ., Engel, Gordon, and Hayes, 2001). Similarly, bondholders have incentiv es to restrict 
managers' ability to take actions that transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders and/or managers 
(Yermack, 1995). Consequently, the use of equity-based incentives should be lower when external 
monitoring is greater. 
We use three proxies for alternative monitoring mechanisms. Monitoring by external 
shareholders (e.g. , venture capitalists and institutional investors) is measured using the number of five 
percent blockholders (excluding firm executives) and the percentage of shares held by outside 
blockholders. These variables are obtained from the firms' proxy statements, and are denoted Num 
Blockholders and Block Ownership Pet, respectively. Firm leverage, a proxy for monitoring by debt 
holders, is measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (Leverage). Block Ownership Pet and 
Leverage are expected to be negatively related to equity grants. The predicted sign for Num Blockholders 
is less certain. To the extent that each of the large stockholders can monitor employ ees, the relation with 
equity grants should be negative. However, holding the total extent of large external holdings constant 
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(i.e., Block Ownership Pet), larger number ofblockholders can lead to more diffuse and less effective 
monitoring, suggesting a positive relation. 
3.4.2 Attraction and Retention Measures 
Core and Guay (2001) predict that the firm' s investment opportunity set is likely to be associated 
not only with the use of stock options for incentive purposes, but also with their use for attracting and 
retaining employees. This prediction is based on work suggesting that firms with substantial, and 
potentially risky, growth opportunities require higher quality managers and less risk-averse employees 
who are more likely to be attracted to equity-based compensation (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Core and 
Qian, 2000). In addition, we employ several additional variables to capture the importance of employee 
attraction and retention. 
Growth in Employees . We include the percentage growth in employees in the prior year 
(Employee Growth) as a predictor variable under the assumption that attraction and retention issues are 
more important when firms are rapidly expanding their workforce. If rapidly growing firms are using 
equity grants to attract and retain the appropriate type of employee, employee growth should be positively 
associated with equity grants. 
Program Objectives. As discussed above, respondents to the iQuantic survey were asked to rank 
the relativ e importance of various objectives for their equity grant programs. The variables Attraction 
Objective and Retention Objective represent the self-reported importance of these two program objectives. 
Academic researchers and the business press suggest that these objectives are positively associated with 
the use of equity grants in new economy firms. 
Regional Indicators. We include two regional indicator variables to control for potential labor 
market differences that could affect the use of equity grants for attraction and retention. The two 
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indicators represent the west coast (primarily the Silicon Valley) and east coast (primarily New England), 
regions that reportedly experienced considerable competition for technical employees during this period. 
3.4.3 Other Determinants 
We include several variables to capture other potential determinants of equity grants. 
Tax Rates. Similar to Plesko (1999) and Core and Guay (200 1 ), we measure the marginal tax rate 
using two indicator variables. Low marginal tax rate firms are assumed to have negative pretax book 
income and net operating loss carry-forwards. Low Tax equals one for firms that satisfY these restrictions, 
and zero otherwise. High marginal tax rate firms are defined as those with have positiv e pretax book 
income and no net operating loss carry-forwards. High Tax equals one for firrns that satisfy these 
restrictions, and zero otherwise. 19 Equity grants are expected to be negatively associated with the high tax 
indicator and positively associated with the low tax indicator. 
Cash Flow. Two variables are used to measure the amount of cash available for compensation 
payments. The first variable captures the net cash flow from operating activities minus cash dividends, 
capital expenditures, and research and development expenditures. We divide the level of cash flow by the 
number of employees (Cash Flow/Employee) to assess the ability of the firm to pay employees using cash 
compensation. The second variable (Cash Level/Employee) proxies for the level of cash available for 
compensation purposes. This variable equals cash plus marketable securities minus current liabilities, 
19Graham (2000) outlines a more sophisticated strategy for estimating a firm's marginal tax rate by incorporating a 
greater number of features of the tax code and by calculating expected tax benefits by forecasting possible scenarios 
for future income. Unfortunately, Graham's tax rates are not available for a large number of firms in our sample. 
Another problem in estimating the marginal tax rate of our firms (that neither the Graham nor Plesko procedures 
incorporate) relates to the accounting treatment of the tax benefits of stock options. In particular, the deduction 
firms receive for nonqualified stock options in the year of exercise is not accounted for as a deduction from the 
firm's income tax expense. Instead, it is treated as a credit to additional paid-in-capital and a debit to income taxes 
payable liability account. Therefore, the current portion of the firm's income tax expense overstates the actual taxes 
due on the firm's current taxable income. See Hanlon and Shevlin (2001) for additional discussion and analysis. 
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div ided by the number of employees. If cash constrained firms are using equity grants in place of cash 
compensation, the coefficient on these variables should be negative. 
Survey Year. Since we are pooling across two survey years, we include an indicator variable for 
surveys conducted in 2000 (YR2000) to control for differences between the 1999 and 2000 survey 
periods. 
3.5 Comparison to Old Economy Firms 
Table 4 provides a comparison of equity grants and their hypothesized determinants for our new 
economy sample and a sample of"old economy" firms. The old economy sample consists of traditional 
durable and nondurable manufacturers, which many commentators claim are the epitome of the old 
economy (e.g., Balkin, Markman, and Gomez-Mejia, 2000). We begin selecting the old economy sample 
using all manufacturers in Execucomp with available data for fiscal years 1998 and 1999. We then 
eliminate all firms that also appear in our new economy sample and all four-digit SIC codes with three or 
more observations in the iQuantic survey. To ensure comparability between the samples, the equity grant 
values for the old economy firms are computed using the same methods as those for the new economy 
firms . Equity grants for lower-level employees and institutional blockholdings are not available from 
Compustat or Execucomp, and are not included in the table. 
The two samples exhibit significant differences on nearly every dimension. The mean (median) 
CEO in a new economy firm receives 78.2% (86.9%) of compensation from equity grants, versus 26.9% 
(1 9.3%) in an old economy firm. Equity grants to vice presidents show similar differences. As expected, 
new economy firms have lower book to market ratios, larger research and development expenditures 
relative to sales, and faster growth in sales and employees20 New economy firms also have substantially 
20 The mean (median) market-to-book ratios for our new economy sample are 12.1 (6.7) for firms in the 2000 survey 
and 7.7 (3 .65) for firms in the 1999 survey. Note that the mean market-to-book ratio is not simply the inverse of the 
mean book-to-market ratio because the ratios have highly skewed distributions and because some of the 
observations have negative values for book value. The second reason also explains why the median value of the 
market-to-book ratio is not simply the inverse of the median book-to-market ratio. 
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larger cash holdings available for compensation, but the mean level of cash flow av ailable for 
compensation payments is substantially more negative. Consistent with results in the corporate finance 
literature on firms with large levels of intangible assets, the new economy sample uses a relatively small 
amount of leverage for financing purposes. Although prior stock returns are not statistically different, the 
typical new economy firm has larger monthly stock price volatility and lower return on assets, and is less 
likely to fall in the high tax bracket. 
4. Determinants of Equity Grants 
4.1 Executive Equity Grants in New Economy Firms 
We begin our analysis by examining the determinants of equity grants to CEOs and vice 
presidents of new economy firms. The results are reported in Table 521 The models explain a substantial 
proportion of equity grants to these executives, with adjusted R2 s of 0.557 in the CEO model and 0.375 in 
the vice president model. Many of the significant relations are similar to those found in studies of 
traditional firms. As predicted, the coefficient on investment opportunity set is positive and significant in 
both tests. Larger firms also tend to grant more equity as a percent of compensation than smaller firms. 
The outside monitoring variables exhibit mixed statistical associations with equity grants. Consistent 
with prior studies, leverage is negative and significant in the CEO model, supporting claims that 
monitoring by debt holders is a substitute for equity-based incentives. Similarly, block ownership 
percentage is negatively associated with equity grants to vice presidents. However, the number of five 
percent blockholders has a significant positive association with grants to vice presidents, suggesting that 
more dispersed institutional holdings encourage greater use of equity incentives, after controlling for the 
total percentage of shares held by blockholders. 
The attraction and retention proxies show mixed results. Retention objectives are positive and 
significant (p < 0.01, two-tailed) in the CEO model, consistent with claims that retention is an important 
210 bservations are deleted from all of our regression estimations if the absolute values of their studentized residual 
are greater than three. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores indicate no serious problems with multicollinearity in 
any of our regression models. 
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determinant of equity grants in new economy firms. However, attraction objectives are not significant in 
this model. Moreover, employee growth is negatively related to CEO grants, opposite our prediction. 
None of the attraction and retention proxies is significant in the vice president model. These results 
provide relatively little support for claims that attraction and retention objectives are important drivers of 
equity-based compensation in new economy :firms. 
In contrast to studies oftraditional firms (e.g., Core and Guay, 1999, 2001), we find no evidence 
that cash constrained new economy firms make greater use of equity-based compensation to conserve 
cash. In fact, the coefficients on Cash Flow/Employee and Cash Level/Employee are both positive and 
significant in the CEO model, as is the coefficient on Cash Level/Employee in the v ice president model. 
Thus, new economy firms with larger cash reserves tend to make greater use of equity grants than those 
with cash constraints. 22 
The effects of taxes and past performance on equity grants to executives are limited. High Tax 
has the predicted negative relation in the CEO model, but is not significant in the vice president model. 
Low Tax, Volatility, Prior Return, and Prior ROA are not significant at the ten percent level (two-tailed) 
in either model, even though a number of studies of equity grants in traditional firms have found these 
variables to be significant predictors 23 
22 These results are robust to scaling our cash variables by assets rather than the number of employees. 
23 Core and Guay (1999, 2001) argue that current equity holdings also influence the level of new equity grants. We 
do not include prior holdings in the equity grant prediction models for two reasons. First, since existing holdings are 
due in large part to prior equity grants and are likely to share the same determinants, including these holdings in the 
model will tend to reduce the explanatory power of the other predictor variables. Second, the iQuantic survey does 
not provide data on existing equity holdings by employees at the various hierarchical levels and fimctions. 
However, this information is available for the top five executives in the firms' proxy disclosures. To provide some 
evidence on the relation between existing equity holdings and equity grants, we reestimated the models in Table 5 
after including the value of equity holdings and in-the-money options as additional predictor variables. Contrary to 
Core and Guay's (1999, 2001) hypothesis, the value of existing CEO and vice president option holdings is not 
statistically related to equity grants. Existing equity holdings are also insignificant in the vice president model, and 
are p ositively associated with CEO option grants, opposite Core and Guay's (1999, 2001) prediction. The 
significance of the remaining variables changes little. Prior ROA and the eastern region indicator are now 
significant and positive in the CEO model, while cash level is no longer significant in the vice president model. 
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4.2 Comparison of Executive Equity Grant Determinants in Old and New Economy Firms 
The results in Table 5 indicate that at least some of the hypothesized economic determinants are 
associated with equity grants to executives of new economy firms. However, the tests provide no direct 
ev idence on the extent to which these determinants are similar to or different than those for old economy 
firms . W e examine this issue by estimating the equity grant determinants models after pooling our 
sample of new economy firms and the "old economy" manufacturers discussed in Section 3.5. Since the 
program objectives variables are not available for the old economy firms, they are excluded from the 
models. We also exclude other variables that are not relevant to the old economy firms (the two location 
variables and YR2000 indicator) and the two blockholder measures (Num Blockholders and Block 
Ownership Pet). 
Our first test estimates equity grants to executives as a function of the remaining predictor 
variables, but allows the intercept to vary across the two samples by including an indicator variable for 
new economy firms. If the same economic model applies to both new and old economy firms, this test 
allows us to determine whether equity grants in new economy firms are actually higher than those in their 
old economy counterparts after controlling for differences in firm characteristics. This approach is 
similar to that used by Anderson, Banker, and Ravindran (2000) in their study of compensation practices 
in information technology firms relative to more traditional firms. Our second test allows both the 
intercept and slope coefficients to vary across the two subsamples by incorporating interactions between 
the new economy indicator and the predictor variables, as well as the new economy indicator alone. In 
this manner, we can examine whether the relative importance of the hypothesized equity grant 
determinants also differs across the two sectors. 
The results are provided in Table 6. When only the intercept is allowed to vary, the new 
economy indicators are positive and highly significant (p < 0.001, two-tailed) in both the CEO and v ice 
president models, indicating that the common equity grant model does not fully explain differences in 
compensation practices in old and new economy f irms. The other results are generally similar to those in 
the new economy sample. Two exceptions are Leverage in the CEO model, which is no longer 
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significant, and Volatility in the vice president model, which is now statistically positive. More 
importantly, the coefficients on Cash Flow/Employee and Cash Level/Employee are significantly different 
in the pooled sample. In the earlier new economy tests, these variables were positively related to CEO 
equity grants, with Cash Level/Employee also positively related to vice president grants. In the pooled 
sample, the coefficient on Cash Level/Employee is negatively related to CEO grants and the coefficient on 
Cash Flow/Employee is negatively related to vice president grants. This evidence suggests that the 
influence of available cash on the form of compensation differs between old and new economy firms. 
When we allow the intercept and slopes to vary across sectors, several significant differences 
emerge between the two groups. The investment opportunity set plays a much more important role in 
determining equity grants in new economy firms than in the old economy manufacturers. The interaction 
between the new economy indicator and JnvestOppSet is positive and highly significant (p < 0 .001, two-
tailed) for CEOs and v ice presidents. These results are consistent with Balkin, Markman, and Gomez-
Mejia (2000), who find a stronger association between equity-based compensation and an innovation 
construct in high technology manufacturers than in other manufacturers. 
The other significant differences relate to vice president grants. Both Prior Return and Cash 
Level/Employee have more positive effects on vice president equity grants in new economy f"mns. 
Volatility and Low Tax, on the other hand, have significantly smaller coefficients. Consistent with the 
prior evidence, the positive coefficient on the interaction between the new economy indicator and Cash 
Level/Employee is larger in absolute value than the negative coefficient on Cash Level/Employee alone, 
again indicating that the availability of cash for compensation purposes has opposite effects on equity 
grants in new and old economy firms. 
When differences in slope coefficients are taken into account, the new economy intercept term 
remains significant in both models (p < 0.001 , two-tailed). This ev idence suggests that new economy 
firms provide a larger percentage of compensation to vice presidents in the form of equity grants, even 
after taking the hypothesized economic determinants into account. In sum, the results in Table 6 suggest 
that the relative importance of some of the factors influencing executive equity granting practices in new 
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economy firms is significantly different than those in old economy manufacturers, but that these 
differences do not completely explain the higher equity grants in this sector. 
4.3 Determinants of Equity Grants to Non-Executives and Across Functional Areas 
Table 7 extends the analysis to examine the determinants of equity grants to non-executives and 
across the various functional areas. Since compensation data for lower-level employees are not publicly 
available, our tests are limited to the new economy sample. The adjusted R2s range from 0.203 to 0.284. 
Similar to the executiv e-level results, the most consistent predictors are JrwestOppSet, Employees, and 
Cash Level/Employees, all of which are positively related to non-executive equity grants. The significant 
positive coefficients on Employees support Core and Guay' s (2001) hypothesis that larger firms use non-
executive equity grants to a greater extent because monitoring costs are h igher. However, whereas Core 
and Guay ' s (200 1) examination of stock option grants to non-executives in a broad cross-section of firms 
finds a positive association with cash constraints, we again find that new economy firms that are less cash 
constrained (i.e., have more cash available for compensation purposes) tend to make larger equity grants 
to non-executives, and no evidence that cash constraints are associated with greater use of equity grants. 
External monitoring also appears to play a role in the use of equity grants to lower-level 
employees. The coefficient on the percentage of equity held by five percent blockholders (Block 
Ownership Pet) is negative in every model, and significant in the manager, indiv idual contributor, 
technical, and sales groups. This result is consistent with the earlier vice president results, as well as with 
Engel, Gordon, and Hayes (2001 ), who find the use of equity-based incentives for CEOs in new IPOs to 
be negatively related to the level of venture capitalist involvement in the firm. Leverage is consistently 
negative and is significant in the director, manager, and technical models, again suggesting that 
monitoring by bond holders is a substitute for equity-based incentives. The other predictor variables are 
generally insignificant. In particular, Attraction Objective and Retention Objective are not significant in 
any of the models, implying that these goals have little effect on the extent to which annual compensation 
for non-executives is equity-based. 
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4.4 Determinants of Equity Grants for New Hires 
The insignificant associations between attraction and retention requirements and ongoing equity 
grants provide no evidence that the relative importance of these requirements influences granting 
behavior, despite survey participants' claims that attraction and retention issues are primary objectives of 
their equity grant programs. To examine this issue in more detail, we investigate the determinants of 
equity grants to newly hired employees. These data are the average equity grants actually made to new 
hires. We expect attraction and retention issues to be relatively more important in this setting for a 
number of reasons. First, attraction objectives are more closely related to newly hired employees than to 
existing employees. Second, new hires have no existing equity incentives with features such as vesting 
periods that are claimed to promote retention, and are likely to have few if any equity holdings in the 
firm. As a result, new equity grants may be required to provide the retention incentives that would 
otherwise be provided by existing equity and option holdings. In fact, equity grants to new hires are 
substantially larger than ongoing grants in our sample. The mean (median) ratio of grants to new hires 
relative to ongoing grants are 1. 82 (1 . 52) for v ice presidents, 1. 70 (1.49) for directors, 1.54 (1.30) for 
managers, 1.64 (1 .32) for individual contributors, 1.85 (1 .09) for non-exempts, 1. 83 (1.46) for technical 
employees, 1. 86 (1.41 ) for non-technical employees, and 1.53 ( 1.20) for sales personnel. Finally, since 
the past performance of the firm occurred before the new employees were hired, the initial equity grants 
should not be confounded by efforts to use equity grants to reward or penalize past employee 
performance. 
The estimation results for new hires are provided in Table 8. Since only 18 firms reported 
information for newly hired CEOs, this hierarchical level is not included in the analysis. In contrast to the 
earlier results, the importance of retention objectives is positively associated with new hire grants, and is 
statistically significant (p < 0. 1 0, two-tailed) for all levels except non-exempts. Similarly, the investment 
opportunity set, which is also likely to reflect greater need for employee retention (Core and Guay, 2001), 
is positive in every model and significant for lower hierarchical levels (managers on down) and in non-
technical and sales functions. Although the coefficients on Attraction Objective are generally positive, 
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none is statistically significant. In addition, the coefficients on Employee Growth are all negative and are 
only significant in the non-exempt model. These results indicate that retention objectives are important 
determinants of new hire equity grants in these firms, but provide no evidence that attraction objectives 
influence these grants. 
Consistent with our earlier fmdings, Cash Level/Employ ee is positively associated with new hire 
grants below the vice president level, providing no support for claims that new economy firms under cash 
constraints use equity grants in place of cash compensation. This finding is supported by significant 
positive coefficients on Cash Flow/Employee in the director, manager, and technical models. 
Surprisingly, prior stock returns are positively related to grants to managers, individual contributors, and 
non-exempt employees. One explanation for these results is that following a period of good stock market 
performance, new hires are optimistic about future performance, and so their demand for options 
increases. 24 Another possibility is that existing employees are awarded more options as a reward for past 
behavior, with new hires also receiv ing higher than "normal" equity grants to maintain internal equity 
within the firm's compensation structure. Though plausible, this interpretation is inconsistent with the 
insignificant relations between the past performance variables and ongoing equity grants found in earlier 
tests. Finally, new hire grants to non-technical employees are negatively associated with the number of 
employees, and employee growth is negatively associated with new hire grants to non-exempts. None of 
the other coefficients is signif icant at the ten percent level (two-tailed). 
24 This interpretation is consistent our finding (in untabulated correlations between the hypothesized determinants of 
equity grants and the self-reported objectives for using equity grants described in Table 2) that Prior R eturn has a 
significant positive association with the use of stock option plans for attracting employees. 
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5. Performance Consequences of Equity Grants 
5.1 Methodological Issues 
In this section, we provide some exploratory analysis of the relation between the equity grant 
decisions and subsequent accounting and stock price performance. An important issue that limits these 
tests is the endogenous nature of compensation plan design. As discussed in Demsetz and Lehn (1985), if 
all organizations in the sample are optimizing with respect to equity grants, there should be no statistical 
association between organizational performance and the observed endogenous choice, once the 
exogenous determinants of this choice are controlled in the structural model. Under this scenario, any 
statistically significant coefficient on the equity grant choice will only occur because of measurement 
error, misspecification of functional form, inadequate set of exogenous controls, etc2 5 
An alternative to the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) perspective is that new economy firms are 
dynamically learning and moving toward their optimal equity grant levels, but that our cross-sectional 
sample consists of observations that are distributed around the sample firms' optimal incentive practices. 
This perspective is advocated by Milgrom and Roberts (1 992, p. 43 ), who contend that tests of economic 
theories ofthe benefits of organizational practices such as equity grants require the very imperfections in 
the rationality of people and the adaptability of organizations denied by many economic theories. 
According to Milgram and Roberts (1992, p. 43), a more defensible position is that people learn to make 
good decisions and that organizations adapt by experimentation and imitation. Thus, at any given point in 
time, a cross-sectional sample will be composed of organizations that vary with respect to the optimal 
adoption of a given practice. As a result, the observed cross-sectional variation in equity grant practices 
provides a means for assessing the performance consequences of this organizational choice. 
25 Another limitation to this analysis is the difficulty in detecting performance differences over multi-year time 
periods (see Barber and Lyon (1996, 1997) for discussions of the limitations oflong-window performance tests). 
This specification concern limits om ability to draw strong inferences from our performance tests. 
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Our approach for examining the performance consequences of equity grants is to examine the 
association between the residuals from the empirical prediction models in Tables 5 and 7 and subsequent 
firm performance. If the systematic portion of these models represents the appropriate choice for a firm, 
then any residual deviation (positive or negative) should adversely affect firm performance. This 
interpretation is consistent with option grant studies by Core and Guay (1999, 2001 ), which assume that 
their model of option grant behavior (which includes the traditional predictor variables included in our 
model) reflects the movement to optimal equity incentive levels. A finding of lower performance in firms 
that deviate from the predicted equity grant model would support the joint hypothesis that, on average, 
firms in the new economy have reached their equilibrium compensation practices, and that our prediction 
model represents optimal practice. 
Alternatively, the systematic part of the model can be v iewed as the average benchmark for 
equity grants by similar firms in the sample. In this context, the residual measures the extent to which a 
firm makes equity grants that are higher or lower than firms with similar characteristics. If the majority 
of new economy firms are still learning whether their equity grant levels are optimal in this uncertain 
competitive environment, the negative or positive equity grant residuals represent the extent to which 
these firms have granted equity with lower or higher values than grants by similar firms, regardless of the 
optimal level of these grants. Under this scenario, the hypothesized performance consequences of these 
"unexpected" equity grants is uncertain. 
5.3 Performance Measures 
We investigate the performance consequences of new economy equity grants using subsequent 
accounting and stock price returns. Both of these performance measures offer advantages and 
disadvantages. Short-term accounting returns are likely to reflect actual changes in operational 
performance and are not influenced by the speculative bubble in new economy share prices, but exclude 
the long-term performance implications that equity grants are typically designed to motivate. In addition, 
recent articles in the business press suggest that the reported accounting earnings of a number of new 
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economy firms during the period under study were manipulated to increase reported accounting returns 
(e.g., Kahn, 2000). Stock price returns, on the other hand, incorporate the market's expectation ofthe 
long-term performance implications of these equity grants and are more closely tied to the grants' 
ultimate objective of increasing shareholder value. However, the collapse of new economy share prices 
in April, 2000 suggests that stock prices are noisy indicators of economic performance in these firms. 
Given these strengths and weaknesses, consistent findings across the two performance measures are more 
likely to reflect actual changes in performance rather than measurement error. 
We investigate accounting return on assets (ROA) in the second year following the option grant. 
Stock price performance (RETURN) is measured over the 24 month period after the equity grants2 6 The 
1999 survey collected data for grants that typically were made at the end of 1997 or beginning of 1998. 
Thus, for December fiscal year end firms, we measure firm performance using the average continuously 
compounded monthly return (including div idends) over the 24 months starting in Aprill 998. A similar 
approach is used for firms included in the 2000 survey and for firms with different fiscal year ends. This 
24-month return covers the pre-collapse period for the 1999 respondents and a mix of pre- and post-
collapse periods for the 2000 respondents.27 
26 We choose the second year and 24 month periods to capture at least some of the longer-term performance 
implications of equity grants. We also estimated performance regressions using ROA one year after the grants, and 
stock price returns over the 12 month and 36 month periods after the grants. Results using first year ROA and 12 
month stock returns were very similar to those using second year ROA and 24 month returns. However, none of the 
models using 36 month stock returns was statistically significant, due in part to very small sample sizes in these 
tests. 
27 An important issue in the stock return tests is the whether the anticipated effects of the equity grants on 
performance are already impounded into stock price by the market. If markets are assumed to be efficient, market 
prices will impound all expected future performance effects (whether due to incentive, attraction, or retention 
dimensions) at the date the information about equity grants becomes publicly available. If this is the case, and 
assuming the market processes this information correctly, we should observe no relation between the equity grant 
residuals and subsequent performance. However, the market does not necessarily know the optimal level of equity 
grants ex ante. If true, the market should systematically revise its assessment of the optimal level of grants ex post 
as it learns more about the consequences of the grant decisions. Furthermore, grants to lower-level employees are 
not disclosed in detail, making it less likely that the market has already impounded this information into price. 
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5.4 Control Variables 
We include a variety of control variables in the cross-sectional analyses. We first incorporate 
proxies for existing stock and option holdings to account for the effects of other equity-based incentives 
on performance. These variables control for Core and Guay ' s (1999, 2001) claim that the incentive 
effects of equity-based compensation are a function of the employee's entire portfolio of equity holdings. 
Since the iQuantic survey does not include information on employees' existing equity holdings, we are 
limited to the information in the firms' proxy statements. Consequently, we control for existing equity-
based incentives using the value of stock and option holdings of the firm' s top five executives in the year 
prior to the equity grant. The market value of the executives' stock holdings is based on the stock' s 
closing price at year end. The value of option holdings is proxied by the difference between the market 
value and exercise price for all in-the-money options, as reported in the proxy statement. Since equity 
and options potentially have different incentive effects due to their different payoff structures, we include 
separate variables for equity and option holdings. To maintain consistency with the equity grant variables 
and provide a measure of the incentive intensity of these holdings, we scale these values using a proxy for 
the executives' wealth that is not tied to these equity-based incentives28 
Similar to the equity grant variables, we attempt to control for endogeneity by estimating the 
values of existing equity and option holdings as a function of the same independent variables used in the 
earlier prediction models29 The residuals from these estimates (denoted Equity Residual and Options 
Residual, respectively) represent "unexpected" stock and option holdings. We include separate variables 
for positive and negative residuals to allow for potential differences between equity and option holdings 
that are larger or smaller than predicted. 
28 We scale existing equity (option) holdings by the value of equity (option) holdings plus ten times the executives' 
salary. Our results are robust to measuring wealth using five or fifteen times salary. 
29 The adjusted R2s are 0.579 in the equity holding prediction model and 0.379 in the options holding model. 
InvestOppSet, E mploy ees, Cash LeveYEmployee, and Prior R eturn are positive and significant in both models, and 
Cash F low/Employee is negative and significant in both models. Attraction Objective, Retention Objective, 
E mployee Growth, and Prior ROA are positively associated with equity holding. Blockholder P et is negatively 
associated with equity holdings, while Volatility and High Tax are negatively associated with option holdings. 
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We also include six industry indicators (computer, software, semiconductor, telecommunications, 
networking, and internet) and an indicator for the year of data collection (thereby controlling for the 
collapse in new economy share prices). These indicator variables control for industry-specific and time 
period-specific variations in performance that are unrelated to the equity grants (e.g., the collapse in new 
economy share prices). Since, small firms and firms with high book-to-market ratios tend to earn higher 
rates of return (e.g ., Fama and French, 1992), we include past realizations of these two factors as control 
variables. Given the innovative, technological nature of our sample, we also include JnvestOppSet as a 
control variable, as well as past volatility to control for firm risk. Finally, prior return on assets is 
included in the ROA model to control for autocorrelation in accounting returns. 
5.5 ROA Results 
The ROA results are reported in Table 9. Adjusted R2s range from 0. 142 to 0.485, with the 
greatest explanatory power in the CEO and technical employee models. We find consistent evidence that 
firms with option grants and holdings that are lower than predicted by the benchmark model have lower 
accounting performance in subsequent years. Smaller than expected equity grants to CEOs, directors, and 
technical employees are associated with lower accounting returns at the ten percent level or better (two-
tailed), while smaller than expected equity grants to non-technical employees are negatively associated 
with ROA at the twelve percent level (two-tailed). ROA also has a significant positive association with 
Options Residual" in all but one of the models, indicating that lower than expected option holdings by top 
five executives are associated with lower accounting returns. 
In contrast, we find almost no evidence that firms with larger than expected grants or holdings 
have lower subsequent accounting returns. Only one coefficient on Grant Residuat is negative and 
statistically significant, and then at the fifteen percent level (two-tailed). In addition, all of the 
coefficients on Options R esiduat and Equity Residuat are positive, with several marginally significant (p 
< 0.1 5, two-tailed). Most surprising are the significant negative coefficients on Equity Residuat in the 
director, technical, and non-technical models. These results indicate that lower than expected equity 
31 
holdings by top five executives are associated with higher ROA. The exploratory results in Table 9 
provide some evidence that unexpectedly low option grants to executives and technical employees and 
unexpectedly small option holdings by executives hav e a significant, negative association with 
subsequent accounting returns, but provide limited and mixed evidence that executives' existing equity 
holdings or higher than expected option levels influence future ROA. 
5.6 Stock Price Returns 
Similar analyses using stock price returns as the performance variable are presented in Table 10. 
The adjusted R2s range from 0.088 to 0.270. Equity grants are statistically associated with stock returns 
in relatively few cases. Instead, any stock market performance effects of equity-based incentives appear to 
be related to total equity and option holdings by executives. Options Residuat is positive and significant 
in all but one model. This result is similar to the significant positive coefficients on Options Residuat in 
the ROA models, and again suggests that lower than expected option holdings by top five executives are 
associated with lower subsequent performance. Also consistent with the ROA results are the significant 
negative coefficients on Equity Residuat in most regressions in Table 10. This unexpected result implies 
that stock returns are higher when top executives' equity holdings are lower than expected. The results 
for positive deviations from the benchmark models are mixed. Neither Options Residua( nor Equity 
R esiduat is statistically insignificant in any of the models. Combined with the ROA results, the stock 
return evidence suggests that lower than expected executive option holdings have a significant, negative 
relation with future performance. In contrast, lower than expected equity holdings are associated with 
higher performance, an unexpected finding requiring additional research. 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper examines the structure and performance consequences of equity grants to employees 
of new economy firms. We find that the relative importance of a number of factors influencing executive 
equity granting practices in new economy firrns are substantially different than those in old economy 
manufacturers. We then examine the economic determinants of annual equity grants across lower levels 
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of the organizational hierarchy and across different functional areas of new economy firms. We find that 
employee retention objectives, which new economy firms rank as the most important goal of their equity 
grant programs, have a significant impact on new hire grants, but not on annual, ongoing grants. We next 
examine whether differences in the structure of equity grants are related to subsequent accounting and 
stock market performance of new economy firms. Our exploratory performance tests indicate that lower 
than expected option grants to CEOs, directors, and technical employees are associated with lower 
accounting performance in subsequent years. Lower than expected existing option holding by top 
executives are also associated with lower stock returns. However, greater than expected equity grants 
have relatively little association with future performance, providing no support for claims that the large 
equity grants by new economy firms have a substantial negative impact on shareholder value. 
Furthermore, lower than expected equity holding by top five executives have an unexpected negative 
association with both return on assets and stock returns, providing preliminary evidence that future 
performance is higher when equity holdings are lower than expected. Finally, the accounting and stock 
return tests provide little evidence that equity grants to broad groups of lower-level employees (managers 
down to non-exempt workers) are associated with performance differences. 
Our results are subject to a number of important limitations. First, due to data limitations we do 
not have existing equity and option holdings for non-executives. Second, although we have attempted to 
include all relevant economic determinants in our benchmark models, the statistical results suggest that 
other factors affect the choice of equity grants in the new economy. Similarly, the large unexplained 
variance in the performance tests indicates that our predictor variables capture only a fraction of the 
determinants of accounting and stock price returns. Third, our performance analyses must be v iewed as 
exploratory given prior research on the difficulties assessing the long-term performance implications of 
endogenous organizational choices. Fourth, there is always the possibility of self-selection in survey 
responses, which limits our ability to generalize the results. Finally, our interpretations are limited by 
potential measurement error in our choice of indicators for the predictor constructs, particularly our 
marginal tax constructs. Despite these limitations, our study provides some of the first evidence on the 
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determinants of equity grants to both upper-level and lower-level executives, as well as exploratory 
insights into the performance benefits from equity grants to employees in different functions and 
hierarchical levels. 
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
%EQUITY GRANT= (the value of stock option and restricted stock grant)/(the value of stock option and 
restricted stock grant + employee salary). Stock options are valued using the discounted expected gain 
approach, with an assumed annual stock price growth of 15%, a five year holding period before the option 
is exercised, and a risk-free rate of 5%. Restricted stock is valued by multiplying the number of shares by 
the fair market value of a share at the date of grant 
Book/Market = ratio of book value to market value of equity in year prior to equity grant 
R&D/Sales = ratio of research and development expenditures to annual sales in the year prior to equity 
grant 
Adv/Sales =ratio of advertising expenditures to annual sales in the year prior to equity grant. 
Sales Growth = growth in annual sales in the year prior to equity grant. 
Volatility = standard deviation of continuous compounded monthly returns during the year prior to equity 
grant. 
Prior Return = average continuously compounded monthly return during the year prior to equity grant. 
Prior ROA = ratio of earnings before taxes to total assets in the year prior to equity grant. 
Employees= natural log of the number of employees in thousands in the y ear prior to equity grant. 
Leverage = ratio of long-term debt to total assets in the year prior to equity grant. 
High Tax = indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a positive pretax book income and no net 
operating loss carry-forwards, and zero otherwise in the year prior to equity grant. 
Low Tax = indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a negative pretax book income and net operating 
loss carry-forwards, and zero otherwise in the year prior to equity grant. 
Cash Flow/Employee = net cash flow from operating activities minus cash dividends, capital 
expenditures, and research and development expenditures divided by the number of employees in the year 
prior to equity grant. 
Cash Level/Employ ee = the book value of cash plus the book value of marketable securities minus the 
book value of current liabilities. 
Employee Growth = growth in number of employees in the year prior to equity grant. 
West Location= indicator variable equal to one if the firm is headquartered in the Western region, and 
zero otherwise. 
East Location= indicator variable equal to one if the firm is headquartered in the Eastern region, and 
zero otherwise. 
Attraction Obj ective = relative ranked importance of attracting new employees (minimum= 0; maximum 
= 100). 
R etention Objective = relative ranked importance of retaining new employees (minimum= 0; maximum= 
100). 
YR2000 = indicator variable equal to one if the survey was conducted during calendar year 2000, and zero 
otherwise. 
Num Blockholder = number of five percent blockholders in the year prior to equity grant. 
Blockholder Pet = proportion of outstanding shares held by blockholders in the year prior to equity grant 
JnvestOppSet =average of the standardized scores for Book/Market, R&D/Sales, Adv/Sales, Sales 
Growth, and natural logarithm of company age (years since IPO). Book/Market and natural logarithm of 
company age are reverse coded. 
M arket Value= market value of equity in the year prior to the equity grant. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample (n = 217) 
A. Primary Location N umber of 0/ o of Sample 
Firms 
East 4 1 18.9% 
Midwest 9 4 .1% 
South 16 7.4% 
West 148 68 .2% 
Canada 3 1.4% 
B. Industry N umber of 0/ o of Sample 
Firms 
Computers/Computer Peripherals 25 11.5% 
Software/Software Services 56 25.8% 
Semiconductors/Semiconductor Manufacturing 42 19.4% 
Telecommunications 27 12.4% 
Networking 16 7.4% 
Internet/E-Commerce 29 13.4% 
Other" 22 10.1% 
C. Year of IPO N umber of 0/ o of Sample 
Firms 
Before 1990 70 32.3% 
1990 7 3 .2% 
1991 6 2 .8% 
1992 6 2 .8% 
1993 17 7 .8% 
1994 11 5 .1% 
1995 11 5.1% 
1996 20 9 .2% 
1997 13 6 .0% 
1998 12 5.5% 
1999 44 20.3% 
"The industries represented in th is segment include medical instruments, instruments, and 
miscellaneous. 
Table 2 
Relative Importance of Self-Reported Objectives for 
Stock Option and Restricted Stock Programs 
A. Objective of Stock Option Program (n = 194) 
Retain 
Reward Specific Proj ect Milestones or Goals 
Attract 
Encourage Stock Ownership 
Reward Past Contributions 
Provide Competitive Total Compensation 
Other 
B. Objective of Restricted Stock Program (n =53) 
Retain 
Attract 
Link Individual to Company Performance 
Provide Competitive Total Compensation 
Reward Performance 
Encourage Stock Ownership 
Reward Specific Project Milestones or Goals 
Minimize Dilution 
Other 
89.7 
68.5 
65.1 
51.4 
38.4 
30.7 
2.4 
7 1. 5 
44.1 
44. 0 
42.8 
33.5 
23.2 
13.9 
8.8 
5.8 
Standard 
Deviation 
19.2 
25.7 
23.7 
30.7 
29.5 
25.4 
14. 1 
Standard 
Deviation 
38.7 
43.9 
40.2 
36.7 
34.2 
27.7 
26.8 
16. 1 
20.8 
aRespondents were asked to rank these objectives, with ties allowed. The ranks for each 
company were then rescaled to range from 0 (not ranked) to 100 (highest rank). A mean value of 
100 means that every respondent rated this objective as the most important objective for their 
stock option or restricted stock program. 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for the Annual Salary and Equity Grants 
Across Hierarchical Levels and Function Areas 
Value of Ratio of Equity Grant 
Salat-y Equity Gmnt to Equity Gmnt + 
Salar 
Hierarchical Level or 
Functional Area Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Chief Executive Officer (n = 11 2) $429,353 $500,000 $5,203,423 $2,582,500 0.7820 0.8691 
Vice President (n = 182) $228,407 $223,958 $864,344 $513,960 0.6926 0.7291 
Director (n = 167) $144,334 $143,750 $159,226 $99,535 0.4715 0.4671 
Manager (n = 133) $115,154 $113,095 $73,755 $43,510 0.3457 0.3059 
Individual Contributor (n = 166) $88,243 $87,500 $44,135 $26,497 0.2992 0.2579 
Non-Exempt (n = 165) $46,220 $40,000 $5,692 $1 ,922 0.1241 0.1080 
Technical (n = 179) $11 2,6 16 $112,500 $96,664 $63,634 0.4214 0.3945 
Non-Technical (n = 169) $107,458 $108,333 $83,737 $52,661 0.4018 0.3807 
Sales (n = 128) $124,294 $118,750 $66,607 $36,048 0.3073 0.2672 
Salary is the average salary compensation for this hierarchical level or functional area. The value stock option grant is the average number of 
stock options and restricted stock granted for this hierarchical level or functional area. Stock options are valued using the discounted expected 
gain approach, with an assumed annual stock price growth of 15%, a five year holding period before the option is exercised, and a risk-free rate of 
5%. Restricted stock is valued by multiplying the number of shares by the fair market value of a share at the date of grant 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics on Equity Grants and Firm Characteristics in New Versus Old Economy Firms 
New Economy Firms Old Economy Firms 
Median Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. 
A. Option Grant Characteristics 
CEO Equity Grant Percentage 0.8691 0.7820 0.2314 0.1933*** 0.2693*** 0.2536 
VP Equity Grant Percentage 0.7291 0.6926 0.1994 0.1326*** 0.1963*** 0.2097 
B. Firm Characteristics 
Book to Market Value Ratio 0.2360 0.3010 0.2218 0.3427*** 0.3820*** 0.2271 
R&D to Sales 0.1328 0.2189 0.3293 0.0093*** 0.0523*** 0.1453 
Advertising to Sales 0.0000 0.0145 0.0474 0.0000 0.010 1 0.0274 
Annual Sales Growth 0.2158 0.8519 2.0208 0.0796*** 0. 1463*** 0.2928 
Market Value ofEquity (billions) 1.1374 6.9943 18.064.8 1.0340 4.4999** 9.6952 
Std. Dev. of Prior Stock Return 0.1613 0.1744 0.0622 0.0845*** 0.0959*** 0.0404 
Prior Stock Return 0.018 1 0.0176 0.0505 0.0 172 0.0161 0.0262 
Prior ROA 0.0560 -0.0557 0.3 149 0.0955*** 0.0836*** 0. 1178 
Employees (thousands) 1.1300 10.1100 25.7000 5.0000*** 12.4900 18.6500 
Long-Term Debt/ Total Assets 0.0315 0.1013 0.1600 0.1808*** 0. 1971 *** 0.1527 
High Tax Rate Indicator 0.0000 0.4648 0.4999 1.0000*** 0.6636*** 0.4728 
Low Tax Rate Indicator 0.0000 0.1315 0.3387 0.0000*** 0.0518*** 0.2217 
Available Cash Flow per Employee -27.1521 -32.4048 53.7910 -0.7638*** -20. 5360*** 73.2494 
Available Cash Level per Employee 12.9080 43.4352 83.9954 -27.2162*** -25.641 2*** 99.8081 
Annual Employee Growth 0.1608 0.2768 0.4869 0.0512*** 0.1079*** 0.2422 
**'*** Statistically significant differences between the new and old economy firms at the 5 and 1 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Table 5 
Determinants of Annual Executive Equity Grants in New Economy Firms 
Regression Model: %EQUITY GRANTt = /30 + /31 lnvestOppSett-l + {32 Volatilityt-l + {33 Prior Retun7t_1 + {34 
Prior ROAt-l + {35 Employeest-l + {36 N um Blockholderst-l + {37 Blockholder Pett-i + {38 Leveraget-l + {39 High 
Taxt-J + {310 Low Taxt-J + {311 Cash Flow/Employee t-J + /3!2 Cash Level/Employeet-J + {313 Employee Growth t-J 
+ {314 West Location+ {315 East Location + {316Attraction Objective + f317R etention Objective + /318 Year 
2000 survey indicator + Et-t 
Expected Vice 
Sign CEO President 
Intercept 0.797*** 0.666*** 
InvestOppSet + 0.075*** 0.039*** 
Volatility +!- -0.156 -0.160 
Prior Return + 0.135 0.110 
Prior ROA + -0.143 0.219# 
Num Blockholders +!- -0.005 0.044** 
Block Ownership Pet -0.114 -0.5 10** 
Employees +!- 0.047*** 0.043*** 
Leverage -0.356*** -0.140 
High Tax -0 .079** -0.024 
Low Tax + 0027 -OO!S4 
Cash Flow/Employee 0.0009** -0.0001 
Cash Level/Employee 0.0007*** 0.0003** 
Employee Growth + -0.175*** 0.051 
West Location +!- -0 .032 -0.061 
East Location +!- 0.115 -0.020 
Attraction Objective + -0 .0007 0.0002 
Retention Objective + 0.003*** 0.0005 
YR2000 0.032 0 .068** 
N 73 104 
Adjusted R2 0.557 0.375 
F -Statistic 6.027 4.431 
p-value 0 000 0 .000 
#, *,**,*** Statistically significant at the 0 .15, 0.10, 0.05, 0.01levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
Note: See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Table 6 
Comparison ofDeterminants of Annual Equity Grants At Top Executive Levels in 
New Versus Old Economy Firms 
Regression Model: %EQUITY GRANTt = {30 + {31 InvestOppSett_1 + {32 Volatilityt_1 + {33 Prior R etur11t_1 + 
/34 Prior R0At_1 + {35 Employeest_1 + {36 Leveraget_1 + {37 High Tax:r_1 + 
{310 Low Taxt_1 + {311 Cash Flow/Employeet_1 + {312 CashLevel/Employeet_1+ {313 Employee Growth t_1 + 
N ewEconomy I ndicators and Interaction Terms+ & 
New Economy Indicator Variable 
Interce~t Onl,r Interce~t and Slo~es 
Expected Vice Vice 
Sign CEO President CEO President 
Intercept 0. 222*** 0. 124*** 0.200*** 0.105*** 
~New Economy 0.587*** 0.517*** 0 .777*** 0. 595*** 
InvestOpp Set + 0. 022*** 0.01 5*** 0.019*** 0.0 12*** 
~New Economy 0.071 *** 0.024* 
Volatility +I- 0. 270 0.393* 0.513* 0.689*** 
~New Economy -0.843 -0.737# 
Prior Return + -0.328 -0.068 -0.457 -0.708 
~New Economy 0.1 95 1.324** 
Prior ROA + 0.030 0.077 0.001 0.073 
~ewEconomy 0.036 -0.082 
Employees +I- 0 024*** 0 021 *** 0 027*** 0 025*** 
~ew Economy -0.002 -0.003 
Leverage -0.026 -0.071 -0.038 -0. 112* 
~ew Economy -0.078 0.105 
High Tax -0.036# -0.016 -0.031 -0.0 15 
~ew Economy -0.033 0.0 14 
Low Tax + 0. 057 0.028 0.054 0.070* 
~ew Economy -0.1 25 -0.168* 
Cash Flow/Employee -0.0001 -0.0003** -0.0002 -0.0003*** 
~ew Economy 0.0002 0.0003 
Cash Level/Employee -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
~New Economy 0.0006 0.0008*** 
Employee Growth + -0.068# -0.0006 -0.104** -0.0417 
~New Economy 0.011 0.0422 
N 626 668 626 668 
Adjusted R2 0.40 1 0.511 0 .408 0.529 
F -Statistic 35.875 59.079 19.760 33.630 
p-value 0 .000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
#,*,**,*** Statistically significant at the 0.15, 0 .1 0, 0.05, 0. 01 levels (two-tailed), respectiv ely . 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Table 7 
Determinants of Annual Eguit~ Grants Across Non-Executive Hierarchical Levels and Functional Areas 
Expected Individual Non- Non-
Sign Director Manager Contributor Exem~t Technical Technical Sales 
Intercept 0.431*** 0.350** 0.226* 0.083 0.436*** 0.355*** 0.381 ** 
InvestOppSet + 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.026** 0.021 *** 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.029** 
Volatility +!- -0.135 0.231 0.122 0.194 0.068 0.084 0.007 
Prior Return + 0.322 0.376 0.513# -0.199 0.351 0.630# 0.212 
Prior ROA + -0.084 0.034 -0.172 -0.208* 0.004 -0.125 -0.084 
Num Blockholders +I- 0.028 0.029 0.025 -0.004 0.038* 0.022 0.032 
Blockholder Pet 
-
-0.387 -0.478* -0.423* -0.071 -0.595** -0.381 -0.422# 
Employees +I- 0.040*** 0.040** 0.035** 0.011 0.033** 0.039*** 0.040** 
Leverage 
-
-0.238* -0.264* -0.065 -0.060 -0.279** -0.120 -0.162 
High Tax 
-
0.011 -0.051 0.007 -0.003 -0.021 0.017 -0.023 
Low Tax + -0.074 -0. 129# -0.093 -0.065# -0.096 -0.089 -0.138# 
Cash Row/Employee 
-
0.0003 0.0005 0.0007* 0.0004* 0.0002 0.0005 0.0008* 
Cash Level/Employee 
-
0.0006*** 0.0006** 0.0006*** 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006** 
Employee Growth + -0.028 -0.091 -0.040 0.027 -0.051 0.047 -0.059 
West Location +I- 0.016 0.004 0.114** 0.008 -0.001 0.046 0.017 
East Location +I- -0.014 0.021 0.082# -0.006 -0.005 0.001 0.021 
Attraction Objective + -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0005 
Retention Objective + 0.0007 0.006 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0004 
YR2000 0.024 0.062 0.005 -0.013 0.022 0.039 0.077* 
N 97 83 100 95 101 97 81 
Adjusted R2 0.236 0.270 0.253 0.284 0.259 0.270 0.203 
F -Statistic 2.647 2.689 2.861 3.073 2.397 2.976 2.130 
g-value 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 
#, *,**.* Statistically significant at the 0.15, 0.10, 0.05, O.Ollevels (two-tailed), respectively. 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Table 8 
Determinants of New H it·e Eguit_r Gt·ants Across Hierarchical Levels and Functional Areas 
Expected Vice Individual Non- Technical Non-
Sign President Director Manager Contributor Exem(!t Technical Sales 
Intercept 0.217 0.225 0.162 0.134 0.019 0.218 0 .355*** 0 .110 
InvestOppSet +a 0.012 0.018 0.036** 0.041 ** 0.019# 0.019 0 .033*** 0 .043** 
Volatility +!- 0.858 0.200 0.143 0.085 0.584# 0.13 1 0.084 -0.055 
Prior Retmn + 0.167 0.659 0.931 * 0.905* 1.380*** 0.519 0.630# 0 .903# 
Prior ROA + -0.086 -0.204 -0.1 66 0.127 -0.048 -0.121 -0 .125 -0 .066 
Num Blockholders +!- -0.021 0.022 0.003 0.014 -0.001 0.024 0.022 0.005 
Blockholder Pet 
-
-0.024 -0.450 -0.253 -0.162 0.032 -0.500 -0.381 -0.189 
Employees +!- 0.014 0.010 0.012 0.025 0.015 0.012 0.039*** 0.016 
Leverage 
-
0.035 0.150 0.096 0.065 -0.091 0.120 -0. 120 0.072 
High Tax 
-
-0.065 -0.049 -0.040 -0.075 -0.056 -0.058 0 .017 -0.032 
Low Tax + -0.074 -0.113 -0.239** -0.198** -0.230*** -0.120 -0.089 -0.230* 
Cash Flow/Employee 
-
0.001 0.001 ** 0.0008# 0.0007 0.0004 0.0011 * 0.0005 0.0006 
Cash Level/Employee 
-
0.0003 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 0.0010*** 0.0006*** 0 .0007** 
Employee Growth + -0.108 -0.102 -0.094 -0.169 -0.105* -0.093 -0 .047 -0 .1 31 
West Location +!- -0.033 0.013 0.023 -0.012 -0.074 0.012 0 .046 -0.02 1 
East Location +I- -0.016 0.013 -0.0009 0.0009 0.015 0.006 0.001 -0.047 
Attraction Objective + 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0007 
Retention Objective + 0.0004** 0.0035** 0.0030** 0.0025* 0.0006 0.003 1 ** 0.000 1 0 .0034** 
YR2000 0.024 -0.001 -0.004 0.025 -0.024 -0.006 0 .039 0 .047 
N 79 85 86 81 53 88 97 73 
Adjusted R2 -0.036 0.137 0.278 0.198 0.478 0.207 0 .270 0 .226 
F-Statistic 0.851 1.741 2.822 2.098 3.644 2.279 2.976 2.1 71 
p-value 0.636 0.054 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.008 0 .000 0 .0 1:'5 
'' ' Statistically significant at the 0.15, 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels (two-tailed), respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Table 9 
Analysis ofReturn on Assets Two Years After the Grant of Equity-Based Incentives in New 
Economy Firms 
Regression Model: ROAt = {30 + {31 Grant Residuaz+ + {32 Grant R esiduat + {33 Equity Residuaz+ + {34 
Equity Residuat + {35 Options R esiduaz+ + /36 Options Residuat + {37 1 nvest0ppSett_1 + {38 Sizet-I + 
{39 Volatilityt_1 + {310 ROA t-1 + + {311 Year 2000 indicator + Industry indicators + &. 
Panel A: Equity Grants Across Hierarchical Levels 
Chief 
Executive Vice Individual Non-
Officer President Director Manager Contributor Exem~t 
Intercept 0.380** 0.006** 0.1 898 0. 104 -0. 122 0.009 
Grant Residuat 0.111 -0.189 -0.407 -0.154 0.164 0.331 
Grant Residual- 0.659* 0.298 1.071 ** 0.044 0.227 -0.430 
Equity Residuat 0. 11 5 0.242 0 .366 0. 31 8 0.296 0.283 
Equity Residual-
-0.1 25 -0. 212 -0.624** -0.20 1 -0.217 -0.357 
Options Residuat 0.070 0.525# 0.345 0 .41 6# 0.504# 0.644* 
Options Residual" 0.492*** 0.360# 0.506** 0.463** 0.312 0.414 * 
InvestOppSet 0.015 -0.004 0 .003 -0.016 -0.002 -0.008 
Size -0.002 0 .027# 0 .018 0.008 0.030 0.009 
Volatility -0.903** -0.204 -0.484 -0.0233 -0.0 15 0.172 
PastROA 0.327** 0.491 ** 0 .567*** 0.299* 0.461 ** 0.51 2** 
COMPU1ER -0.238*** -0.277** -0 .352** -0. 170# -0.233# -0.287** 
SOFTWARE -0.106 -0.225* -0 .220* -0.068 -0. 167 -0.147 
SEMICON -0.106 -0.243** -0 .278** -0.203** -0. 189 -0. 269** 
TELECOM -0.199** -0.233# -0 .197 -0. 149 -0.1 71 -0.138 
NETWORK -0.170# -0.287* -0 .266* -0. 206# -0.216 -0.309# 
INTERNET -0.076 -0.064 -0 .248 0.000 -0.217 -0.353* 
YR2000 0.063# 0.005 0 .028 -0.002 -0.001 0.011 
N 63 78 70 59 72 68 
Adjusted R2 0.458 0.214 0.303 0.322 0.142 0.204 
F -Statistic 4.079 2.236 2.766 2.721 1.689 2. 008 
E-value 0.000 0 .012 0 .003 0.005 0.074 0.029 
Table 9 (continued) 
Panel B: Equity Grants Across Functional Areas 
Non-
Technical Technical Sales 
Intercept 0.284 0.129 0.206 
Grant Residuat -0 .55 1# -0.184 0.128 
Grant Residual" 1.357*** 0.793# -0.302 
Equity Residuat 0 .292 0.315 0.3 17 
Equity Residual" -0.543** -0.532* -0.160 
Options Residuat 0.247 0.354 0.566# 
Options Residual" 0 .482** 0.477* 0.511 ** 
InvestOppSet 0 .006 0.003 -0.000 
Size 0 .009 0.015 0.000 
Volatility -0.437 -0.469 -0.598 
PastROA 0.577*** 0.565*** 0.550*** 
CO l\.1PU1ER -0.362*** -0. 272* -0.283** 
SOFTWARE -0.220** -0.146 -0. 129 
SE!v1ICON -0.272** -0. 217# -0.245** 
TELECOM -0.203# -0.133 -0.171 
NETWORK -0.236# -0. 230 -0.236# 
INTERNET -0 .1 2 1 -0.219 0.000 
YR2000 0 .05 1 0.017 0.030 
N 74 70 59 
Adjusted R2 0.339 0.258 0.310 
F -Statistic 3.1 98 2.413 2. 628 
12-value 0 .00 1 0.008 0.006 
Notes to Table 9 
#, *,**,*** Statistically significant at the 0.15, 0 .1 0, 0.05, 0.01 levels (two-tailed), respectiv ely . 
Grant Residual+ = Actual equity grants minus expected equity grants given the prediction model from 
Tables 5 or 6, if the difference is >0, and 0 otherwise. 
Grant Residuar = Actual equity rants minus expected equity grants given the prediction model from 
Tables 5 or 6, if the difference is <0, and 0 otherwise. 
Equity Residual+= Actual equity holdings (scaled by ten times salary) by top five executives in the year 
prior to the grant minus expected equity holdings (see section 5.4 ), if the difference is >0, and 0 
otherwise. 
Equity Residual"= Actual equity holdings (scaled by ten times salary) by top five executives in the year 
prior to the grant minus expected equity holdings (see section 5.4 ), if the difference is <0, and 0 
otherwise. 
Options Residuat = Actual options holdings (scaled by ten times salary) by top five executives in the 
year prior to the grant minus expected options holdings (see section 5.4 ), if the difference is >0, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Options Residual" = Actual options holdings (scaled by ten times salary) by top five executives in the 
year prior to the grant minus expected options holdings (see section 5.4 ), if the difference is <0, 
and 0 otherwise. 
InvestOppSet =Average of the standardized scores for Book/Market, R&D/Sales, Adv/Sales, Sales 
Growth, and natural logarithm of company age (years since IPO) in the year prior to the equity 
grant. Book/Market and natural logarithm of company age are reverse coded. 
Size = Natural logarithm of the sum of market value of equity and the book v alue oflong-term debt in 
the year prior to equity grant. 
Volatility = Standard deviation of continuous compounded monthly returns during the year prior to equity 
grant. 
CO:tvfPUTER, SOFTWARE, SE:tvflCON, TELECON, NETWORK, AND INIERNET = Indicators 
variable that equal one if the firm reports that it belongs to this industry, and zero otherwise. 
YR2000 = Indicator variable equal to one if the survey was conducted during calendar year 2000, and 
zero otherwise. 
Table 10 
Analysis of 24-Month Subsequent Stock Price Performance Associated With Equity-Based 
Incentives in New Economy Firms 
Regression Model: RETURNt = {30 + {31 Grant Residuat + {32 Grant R esidua! + {33 Equity Residual+ + 
/34 Equity R esidua! + {35 Options R esidual+ + /36 Options Residual + {371 nvestOppSett_1 + {38 Sizet_1 + 
{39 Volatilityt_1 + {310 ROA t-1 + + {311 Year 2000 indicator + Industry indicators + &. 
Panel A: Equity Grants Across Hierarchical Levels 
Chief 
Executive Vice Individual Non-
Officer President Director Manager Contributor Exem~t 
Intercept 0.143*** 0.069* 0 .052 0.069 0.072# 0.076* 
Grant Residuat 0.029 -0.004 -0.01 7 -0.050 -0.058 0.271 ** 
Grant Residual- 0.026 0.068 0 .087 0.088 0.151 * -0.033 
Equity Residuat 0.054 0.008 0.043 0.042 0.031 -0.024 
Equity Residuar -0.085# -0.101 * -0.135** -0. 117* -0.110* -0.048 
Options Residuat 0.010 0. 049 0.035 0.056 0.044 0.039 
Options Residual" 0.123** 0.088** 0 .1 0 1 * 0.077# 0.078* 0.084* 
InvestOppSet 0.008** 0.000 0 .001 0.00 1 0.001 -0.00 1 
Size -0.003 0.001 0 .002 0.000 0.002 -0.00 1 
Volatility -0.228* -0.109 -0.1 12 -0.088 -0.161 # -0.115 
CO:tv1PU1ER -0.045* -0.039* -0.032 -0.039# -0.038# -0.044** 
SOFTWARE -0.049 -0.038* -0.029 -0.03 1 -0.038* -0.030 
SEMI CON -0.012 -0.0 10 0.002 -0.009 -0.011 -0.005 
TELECOM -0.045# -0.042# -0.024 -0.026 -0.044# -0.031 
NETWORK -0.036 -0.035 -0.021 -0.031 -0.033 -0.0 10 
INTERNET -0.059* -0.017 -0.021 0.000 -0.034 -0.059# 
Year 2000 -0.013 -0.024** -0 .021 * -0.022# -0.020* -0.028** 
N 66 79 72 62 73 70 
Adjusted R2 0.238 0.217 0 .160 0.123 0.228 0.270 
F -Statistic 2.268 2.350 1.847 1.571 2.329 2.593 
E-value 0.014 0.009 0 .048 0.012 0.010 0.005 
Table 10 (continued) 
Panel B: Equity Grants Across Functional Areas 
Non-
Technical Technical Sales 
Intercept 0.067 0.081# 0.063 
Residuat -0.019 0.0 10 -0.069 
Residual" 0.090 0.104 0. 076 
Equity Residuat 0.023 0. 025 0.052 
Equity Residual" -0.1 25** -0.132** -0.105# 
Options Residuat 0.031 0.017 0.066 
Options Residual" 0.088* 0. 106** 0.065 
InvestOppSet 0.000 0.002 0.00 1 
Size 0.00 1 0.000 0.000 
Volatility -0.118 -0.197# -0.109 
CO:tvfPU1ER -0.040# -0.030 -0.037 
SOFTWARE -0.037* -0.027 -0.032 
SEMI CON -0.008 0. 007 -0.01 1 
TELECOM -0.034 -0.020 -0.024 
NETWORK -0.028 -0.017 -0.033 
INTERNET -0.030 -0.020 0.000 
Year 2000 -0 .020* -0.024** -0.020 
N 76 72 60 
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.214 0.088 
F -Statistic 1.919 2.208 1.378 
p-value 0 .036 0.0 15 0.201 
Notes to Table 10 
#, *,**,*** Statistically significant at the 0.15, 0 .1 0, 0.05, 0.01 levels (two-tailed), respectiv ely . 
Grant Residual+ = Actual equity grants minus expected equity grants given the prediction model from 
Tables 5 or 6, if the difference is >0, and 0 otherwise. 
Grant Residuar = Actual equity rants minus expected equity grants given the prediction model from 
Tables 5 or 6, if the difference is <0, and 0 otherwise. 
Equity Residual+= Actual equity holdings (scaled by ten times salary) by top five executives in the year 
prior to the grant minus expected equity holdings (see section 5.4 ), if the difference is >0, and 0 
otherwise. 
Equity Residual"= Actual equity holdings (scaled by ten times salary) by top five executives in the year 
prior to the grant minus expected equity holdings (see section 5.4 ), if the difference is <0, and 0 
otherwise. 
Options Residuat = Actual options holdings (scaled by ten times salary) by top five executives in the 
year prior to the grant minus expected options holdings (see section 5.4 ), if the difference is >0, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Options Residuar = Actual options holdings (scaled by ten times salary) by top five executives in the 
year prior to the grant minus expected options holdings (see section 5.4 ), if the difference is <0, 
and 0 otherwise. 
InvestOppSet =Average of the standardized scores for Book/Market, R&D/Sales, Adv/Sales, Sales 
Growth, and natural logarithm of company age (years since IPO) in the year prior to the equity 
grant. Book/Market and natural logarithm of company age are reverse coded. 
Size = Natural logarithm of the sum of market value of equity and the book value of long-term debt in 
the year prior to equity grant. 
Volatility = Standard deviation of continuous compounded monthly returns during the year prior to equity 
grant. 
CO:tvlPUTER, SOFTWARE, SE:tvflCON, TELECON, NETWORK, AND INIERNET = Indicators 
variable that equal one if the firm reports that it belongs to this industry, and zero otherwise. 
YR2000 =Indicator variable equal to one if the survey was conducted during calendar year 2000, and zero 
otherwise. 
